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LANDLORD AND TENANT -

RETALIATORY EVICTION BASED UPON
TENANT RENT WITHHOLDING AS A RESULT OF HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS Is UNLAWFUL AND MAY BE RAISED AS A DEFENSE IN AN
ACTION BY LANDLORD FOR POSSESSION.

Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp. (D.C. Cir. 1972)
In May of 1968, Mrs. Lena Robinson entered into a month to month
lease of a house in the District of Columbia with Diamond Housing
Corporation. Diamond sued for possession when rent was withheld1 due
to the unsafe and unsanitary condition of the premises. 2 Mrs. Robinson
was able to successfully assert a Southall Realty defense8 and prevailed.
Following a second unsuccessful suit, 4 Diamond sued for possession
on the basis of a 30-day notice to quit given a tenant at sufferance 5
and alleged that it was unwilling to make repairs and intended to remove the unit from the market." Mrs. Robinson claimed that the eviction
action was filed in retaliation for the assertion of the Southall Realty
defense in the first suit, and, therefore, could not be maintained.7 The
1. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
For an in-depth study of rent withholding legislation and problems attendant thereto in one jurisdiction, see The Pennsylvania Project-A. Practical Analysis of the
Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act, 17 VILL. L. REV. 821 (1972); Comment, Housing
Market Operations and the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act - An Economic
Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 886 (1972).
2. At the conclusion of the trial in Diamond's original suit for possession, the
jury returned a special verdict finding that housing code violations rendered the leased
house unsafe and unsanitary. 463 F.2d at 858.
3. In Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a lease purporting to convey property
burdened with substantial housing code violations was void and that the landlord
was not entitled to regain possession from the tenant because of the tenant's nonpayment of rent. Id. at 837.
4. Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. App. 1969). In
the second suit Diamond contended that, since the lease was void, Mrs. Robinson
was a trespasser. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court which held that, under the unenforceable lease entered into in
violation of the law, the tenant was a tenant at sufferance rather than a trespasser.
Id. at 495. See note 5 infra.
5. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 45-902 (1968). The 30-day notice is a grace
period which allows the tenant time to find new accommodations before the landlord can require him to vacate the leased premises.
In the District of Columbia, a tenant at sufferance - one holding over and
paying rent after the expiration of his lease - is entitled to a 30-day notice before
his possession can be terminated. Hampton v. Mott Motors, Inc., 32 A.2d 247 (D.C.
Mun. Ct. App. 1943). See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§45-820, -902, -904 (1968)
and accompanying commentary.
6. 463 F.2d at 859. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text infra.
7. In Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1016 (1969), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

(1119)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 6 [1973], Art. 10
1120

VILLANOVA

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

18

trial court, however, granted Diamond's motion for summary judgment 8
and was affirmed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which
held that, as a matter of law, the retaliatory eviction defense was unavailable.0 On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit 10 reversed, holding that in view of the
legislative policy enunciated in the District of Columbia Housing Regulations (Housing Regulations), and the accompanying reliance on private
enforcement, Mrs. Robinson should have been given the opportunity
to prove the facts necessary to establish a retaliatory eviction defense.
Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In recent years many of the common law principles of landlord and
tenant law 1 have been subject to increasing scrutiny, especially as they
relate to urban housing.12 This has been particularly true in the District
of Columbia where court decisions' 3 and legislation 14 have fortified the
federal policy to provide a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family.'"
Three cases are of special import when considering the impact of
Diamond Housing, the foremost of which is Edwards v. Habib.'6 In
Edwards, a landlord gave the 30-day statutory notice to quit to a tenant
who held under a month to month lease after the tenant complained of
7
sanitary code violations to the Department of Licenses and Inspections.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that while a landlord could evict for any legal reason or for no

held that a tenant who had reported housing code violations to the authorities could
raise the retaliatory motive of his landlord as a defense in eviction proceedings.
Id. at 699.
8. 463 F.2d at 859.
9. Robinson v Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833 (D.C. App. 1970).
10. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
11. See generally 20 GEO. L.J. 521 (1931).
12. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969) ; Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See also
Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL
PROP. PROD. & TR. J. 550 (1971); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant:
Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966) ; Skillern, Implied Warranties in
Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DEN. L.J. 387 (1967).
13. See notes 16-29 and accompanying text infra.
14. D.C. HoUSING REG. §§2901-14 (1970). These regulations are set out in
Daniels, Judiciql and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord
Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEo. L.J. 909, 958-61 (app.)

(1971).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
16. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See Comment, Protection for Citizen Complaints to Public Authorities - Prohibition of Retaliatory Evictions: The Case of
Edwards v. Habib, 48 NEB. L. REV. 1101 (1969) ; 23 ARK. L. REV. 122 (1969); 82

L. REV. 932 (1969).
17. 397 F.2d at 688-89. The Department of Licenses and Inspections is charged

HARV.

with the responsibility for overseeing the implementation of housing regulations in
collaboration with the Department of Public Health. The Department of Licenses
.and Inspections conducts inspections, administers and executes regulations, prepares
notices of deficiencies, and investigates all complaints regarding housing. D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. tit. I, App. II, Reorg. Ord. No. 55, pt. III(c) (1966), as amended D.C.
-CODE ENCYCL. ANN. tit. I., App. II, Reorg. Ord. No. 55 (Supp. 1972).
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reason, he could not, as a matter of policy and statutory interpretation, 8
evict in retaliation for a tenant's report of housing code violations to the
proper authorities.' 9 That holding represented a further judicial limita21
tion 20 on the common law rule governing the landlord's power to evict.
In Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,2 2 the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals held, in an action by a landlord for nonpayment of rent, that
a lease purporting to convey property burdened with substantial housing
code violations was illegal and void and that the lessor was not entitled
to possession because of the lessee's nonpayment of rent.23 The court
relied on the Housing Regulations 24 to establish the standard by which
25
the landlord's right to collect rent was to be measured.
In a more recent case, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,20 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, recognizing the needs of modern urban society, held that a warranty of
habitability, measured by the standards of the Housing Regulations, Was
implied by operation of law in leases of dwelling units 2 7 and that a breach

of that warranty gave rise to usual contract remedies. 28 The court
stressed the myriad differences between feudal England and urban America, and stated:
18. The court in Edwards, although it did not decide the issue on constitutional
grounds, devoted a major portion of its opinion to the question of the tenant's constitutional rights and the extent to which the principle of Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), was to be applied. 397 F.2d at 690-98 & nn. 6-37. Shelley established the principle that "private" discriminatory action by individuals may amount to state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment by virtue of a party's resort to
the state judicial system for enforcement of his action. 334 U.S. at 20. See 3 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 193 (1967); 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 323 (1968).
19. 397 F.2d at 699.
20. The dissent argued that this was a matter to be resolved by the legislature
and not by the courts. Id. at 704 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
21. At common law, a tenant without a fixed time period in his lease could be
evicted for any reason or no reason. Note, Retaliatory Eviction - Is California
Lagging Behind?, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 700, 702 (1967). Courts previously have limited
a landlord's power to evict in other circumstances. United States v. Beatty, 288 F.2d
653 (6th Cir. 1961) (prohibition against evicting a tenant for registering to vote
or voting) ; Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (when the government is the landlord, it cannot act arbitrarily and is subject to due process requirements) ; Calvin v. Martin, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 265, 111 N.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1952)
(emergency rent control legislation may limit a landlord's rights).
22. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
23. Id. at 837.
24. D.C. HouSING REG. §§ 2901-14 (1970).
25. 237 A.2d at 836.
26. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. At common law, there was no implied warranty of habitability. However,
an exception was later grafted onto this rule for a short-term lease of a furnished
dwelling. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) ; Note,
Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the Leasing of Residential Housing, 49 N.C.L.
REV. 175 (1970). Other jurisdictions have also adopted the Javins approach to warranties of habitability. See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969) ; Reste
Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
28. 428 F.2d at 1072-73. Leases were considered conveyances at common law,
and the application of contract law principles to leases is a relatively new development in the history of landlord-tenant relations. See Committee on Leases, Trends
in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 550
(1971); Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years? 9 KAN. L. REV. 369 (1961). As to potential contraci
remedies, see Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
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The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the third floor
of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 to 40 feet below, or
even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his
apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek
"shelter" today, they seek a well known package of goods and services - a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but
also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
29
maintenance.
The holdings of Southall Realty and Javins have been codified in
the Housing Regulations. 0 The Southall Realty holding that a lease is
void if entered into while the property is burdened with housing code
violations rendering it unsafe or unsanitary, is contained in section
2
902.1(a). The lease is also rendered void under section 2902.1(b) if
the violations develop during the period of the tenancy and go uncorrected.
The Javins warranty of habitability is codified in section 2902.2. The
Housing Regulations thus appear to allow the tenant in search of a remedy
to proceed under either the Southall Realty illegal contract theory or the
Javins warranty of habitability theory.31
The Housing Regulations codify and expand the holding of Edwards
by protecting the tenant from both retaliatory eviction and from retaliation that falls short of actual eviction 32 when the tenant has complained of
housing code violations to the authorities - the basic Edwards situation organized or joined a tenant's union, or asserted other rights under the
Housing Regulations, 3 3 including rights under section 290134 or section
2902.- It was the interplay of the section 2902 habitability rights with
the section 2910 protection against retaliatory action that formed the
basic issue in Diamond Housing.
Since continued inspection of every dwelling would be an impossible
burden, the housing regulatory scheme relies, to a large extent, upon
individual tenants to bring violations to the attention of the Department of Licenses and Inspections so that investigation can be made.3 6
29. 428 F.2d at 1074 (emphasis added). The opinion also briefly discussed the
warranties available with contract law. Id. at 1075-77.
30. D.C. HoUSING REG. §2902 (1970). See Daniels, supra note 14, at 933.
31. Daniels, supra note 14, at 933.
32. The Housing Regulations provide in pertinent part:
[Amn owner [shall not] . . . cause a tenant to quit a habitation involuntarily,
nor demand an increase in rent from the tenant, nor decrease the services to
which the tenant has been entitled, nor increase the obligations of a tenant ....
D.C. HOUSING REG. §2910 (1970).

33. The Housing Regulations do not expressly provide for rent withholding, but

it has been stated, and supported by analysis, that the right to withhold rent flows
logically from the illegal contract and warranty remedies within the regulations.
Daniels, supra note 14, at 935-38.
34. D.C. HOUSING REG. §2901 (1970) sets forth the standard of policy of the
regulations.
35. D.C. HouSING REG. §2910(a)-(c) (1970).
36. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the
court noted the obvious dependence of code enforcement on private initiative, as
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The inconvenience and possible disclosure of violations which those complaints and inspections cause the landlord form the basis for his desire
to discourage them. As stated by the court, the question presented in the
instant case was whether or not a landlord who had been frustrated in
his effort to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent by the tenant's assertion of a Southall Realty defense could accomplish the same goal by
serving a 30-day notice to quit.3 7 It would seem clear that if the answer

were in the affirmative, no rational or successful housing policy relying
upon tenant enforcement could be pursued. Edwards prohibited retaliatory action taken for the raising of a complaint. If tenants could be subjected to retaliatory eviction by the landlord after violations have been
established, the net effect would be that tenants would not complain.38
Without complaints, there would be no enforcement and the deterioration
in housing conditions would continue.
The Diamond Housing court analyzed the problem by starting with
the assumption that the Edwards principle controlled.3 9 From this, it
followed that Diamond could evict if it could show a valid reason, or
no reason at all for its action. Mrs. Robinson could remain in possession
if she were able to persuade the jury that the eviction was retaliatory.
Diamond's position was that an Edwards defense in this situation was
legally insufficient. Diamond presented four lines of analysis which it contended led to that conclusion; however, the majority was unpersuaded.
As the majority indicated, the question of motivation, which was the
40
basic issue of fact, was inappropriate for summary judgment.
Diamond first argued, relying on the opinion of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals from an earlier action in the RobinsonDiamond dispute, 41 that Edwards should be "limited to its facts. '42 The
well as the number of complaints in a given year resulting from private action.
Id. n.43. See Hearings on S.2331, S.3549, and S.3558 Before the Subcomm. on Business and Commerce of the Senate Comm. on the District of Columbia, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., passim (1966).
37. 463 F.2d at 857.
38. See id. at 860. The Diamond court noted the observation of a previous panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit that there was a "rising incidence of possessory
actions based on notices to quit following closely on the heels of possessory actions
based on nonpayment of rent." Id., quoting Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See Daniels, supra note 14, at 943. For a discussion of the subject of
code enforcement and its effects on the low-cost housing market, see Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
39. 463 F.2d at 861.
40. Id. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
41. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833 (D.C. App. 1970).
See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
42. 463 F.2d at 861. Edwards involved a tenant with a month to month lease
who was given notice to vacate after complaining of housing code violations. The
Diamond tenant was a tenant at sufferance who was occupying the premises under
a void lease. The latter tenant had made no complaint, but had used the violations
as a defense to the landlord's suit for possession. While this factual distinction
exists between the two situations, it is submitted that the majority in Diamond
Housing correctly interpreted the meaning of Edwards - that the tenant is to be
protected from retaliatory action when he takes his part in the enforcement scheme.
The court recognized both the complaint process and rent withholding as part of
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majority disapproved of this narrow approach, noting that there was
"no reason why anything should turn on the different legal status of this
' 43
tenant or the different use to which she put the Housing Regulations.
The Housing Regulations disclosed both a policy statement by the legislative body that private enforcement was necessary, 44 as well as a clear
determination that no tenant could be evicted for successfully asserting
a Southall Realty defense. 45 Such a policy did not rest on the court's interpretation of the intentions of the legislature as it did in Edwards, but on
46
explicit statutory language.
Unsuccessful in the attack on the scope of the Edwards decision,
Diamond opened a second front alleging in its affidavit that it was unwilling to make the repairs required to comply with the Housing Regulations
and stating its intention to remove the unit from the market. 47 Diamond
claimed a right not to have tenants, and, since it was not going to repair,
was arguably following the spirit of the regulations by not renting a
dwelling unfit for habitation. 48 The court was unimpressed with that
approach and, while it recognized a landlord's right to discontinue rental
of all his units, held that that right did not justify the removal of but
some of his units from the housing market in an effort to intimidate his
49
remaining tenants.
the legislative plan for enforcement, and, therefore, considered that the tenant was
to be protected from retaliatory action while engaged in either course. Id. at 863.
43. Id. at 862.
44. See D.C. HOUSING REG. §2901.2 (1970).
45. Id. § 2910(c).
46. The Diamond Housing court flirted with the constitutional issue raised in
Edwards, whether eviction through the judicial process for reporting code violations
to the proper authorities amounted to governmental action hindering first amendment rights, but by-passed it since the legislative intent made such inquiry unneces-

sary. See note 18 supra. The court, nevertheless, did refer to a case relying on the
constitutional issue, Hosey v. Club Van Courtlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). In examining the constitutional issues involved in retaliatory eviction, the
Hosey court stated:
A retaliatory eviction would be judicial enforcement of private discrimination; it would require the application of a rule of law that would penalize a
person for the exercise of his constitutional rights ....
o . . Permitting retaliatory eviction would thus inhibit him in the exercise
of his constitutional rights or, in the words of the Supreme Court, have a chilling effect.
We accordingly hold that the fourteenth amendment prohibits a state court
from evicting a tenant when the overriding reason the landlord is seeking the
eviction is to retaliate against the tenant for an exercise of his constitutional
rights.
Id. at 506 (footnotes omitted).
47. 463 F.2d at 859.
48. Id. at 864. See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1960), wherein the court stated that compliance could be had with the
code by repairing or taking the unit from the market.
49. 463 F.2d at 867. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). The court in Diamond
set no criteria to be used in determining whether Diamond was going out of business
or engaging in a discriminatory partial closing. For example, if Diamond owned
several buildings, would the closing of one amount to going out of business, or would
the discontinuance of apartments on one floor to create office space amount to going
out of business?
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In response to Diamond's argument, attorneys for Mrs. Robinson
suggested that the court formulate comprehensive guidelines to deal with
eviction when the property involved is subject to housing code violations.
While the court declined that invitation because it feared that guidelines
might become a mechanical means of resolving cases,5 ° it did set forth
"clarifications" which it felt were applicable. The court expressed the
hope that the "clarifications" would dispel some confusion surrounding
the issue' 1 and would assist in the case by52case development which the
court favored for Edwards-type situations.
Under section 2301 of the Housing Regulations, occupation of a
dwelling burdened with violations is illegal.5 3 Diamond raised this issue
as its third argument for eviction, claiming it was unlawful for Mrs. Robinson to occupy, and for Diamond to allow occupancy of, such a dwelling
unit. The court initially rejected this reasoning on an estoppel basis, taking
the position that the landlord could not rely on his wrongful neglect in
not repairing the dwelling as a basis for evicting the tenant. 4 Diamond
need not "permit" habitation of such a unit if it could correct the violations,
so that, unless Diamond was unable to repair, the tenant could not be
evicted on this ground.5 5 If Diamond was unable to repair, the tenant
could then be evicted and the unit taken from the market, but not taken,
repaired, and leased to another.5 6
Diamond's fourth point, mootness, was only briefly discussed by
the court. Diamond argued that the case should be dismissed since the
tenant had left the property voluntarily. Since there was a conflict in the
evidence as to why Mrs. Robinson had vacated the premises while the
case was still in the courts, the issue was left for determination upon
remand.5 7
The foundation of the retaliatory eviction defense is the intention of
the landlord, and if his intention is to punish the tenant for lawful action
by evicting him, or to intimidate other tenants by evicting one of their
number who insists on exercising his legal rights, eviction is not permissible.5 8 In Edwards, the court stated that, in the case of a tenant without
a lease, a landlord need not give a reason for an eviction, but only had
to show that the tenant had received the required 30-day notice to quit. 59
The defense of retaliatory motive was available to the tenant, but he was
50. 463 F.2d at 864.
51. Id. at 865.
52. Id. at 864.
53. The Housing Regulations provide that "[n]o owner, licensee, or tenant shall
occupy or permit the occupancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations."
D.C. HOUSING REG. §2301 (1970).
54. 463 F.2d at 868.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 866 n.20. This would produce the most undesirable result since the
tenant, after all his effort, would see the unit made habitable and then rented to
another when his action made the improvement possible.
57. Id. at 870.
58. Id. at 865.
59. 397 F.2d at 699. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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obliged to meet the burden of proof in order to succeed. 60 The Diamond
court, noting that the subjective motive of the landlord could only be determined by objective manifestations, determined that when the manifestations evidenced conduct "inherently destructive" of tenant rights or chilled
their exercise, the presumption was thereby established that the landlord's
motive was improper. 61 The court stated that when the presumption is
established, "it is then up to the landlord to rebut it by demonstrating that
he is motivated by some legitimate business purpose rather than by the
elicit motive which would otherwise be presumed. '6 2 The court left the
"inherently destructive" category open-ended in keeping with its desire
to encourage case by case development, but resolved the issue at hand by
clearly establishing that an unexplained eviction following the assertion of
a Javins or Southall Realty defense was squarely within the "inherently
3
destructive" category and gave rise to the presumption of illicit motive.
The Diamond court appears to have adopted a more liberal stance
with regard to the presumption of a retaliatory motive than that previously
proposed by others.6 4 Instead of a time limit approach, the Diamond
court would examine the actual conduct of the landlord and, if found to
be within the proscribed category, the landlord is presumed to have an
illicit motive, even if the attempt to evict comes over a year after the
initial action by the tenant. The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code (Model Code) evidences a policy not to subject the landlord to such
an open-ended test 65 and its possible undesired side effects. Both the
Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (Uniform Act) and the Model
Code will presume an illicit motive if the landlord moves to evict a tenant
within a given period of time. That approach offers some certainty and
60. Id. at 700.

61. 463 F.2d at 865. The court found an analogous situation regarding proof
of motive in controversies in the field of labor law. See Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
62. Id. (emphasis added). The issue of presumption of unlawful motive after

certain types of eviction also has been discussed in two proposed codes. In the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, acts against the tenant are presumed retaliatory if occurring within one year of the complaint or action by the tenant. UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT § 5.101(b) (request for approval withdrawn
1973) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT]. The Uniform Act is set forth in Subcomm. on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Comm. on Leases, Proposed Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 104 (1973).
See also the accompanying commentary. Id. The Uniform Act covers the Edwards
situation, but not the problem treated in Diamond.
The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code also deals with retaliatory action.
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft 1969)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]. The Model Code provides a six month period of presumption of retaliation, but also lists reasons for which the landlord may evict
provided he overcomes the presumption of retaliation. Id. § 2-407(2) (a)-(h). See
also Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems with
Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1970), for commentary on the Model Code and its solutions to modern problems in the landlordtenant area. The Diamond Housing court was seeking well-reasoned solutions to
these problems based on the social policy expressed by the legislature, rather than
the "instant" solutions to be found by applying a rule to every case.
63. 463 F.2d at 865.
64. See note 62 supra.
65. MODEL CODE §2-407, comment (Tent. Draft, 1969).
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puts both the landlord and tenant on notice that eventually they can be
separated. With the Diamond position, however, the possibility that a
tenant could raise the retaliatory eviction defense can drag on long past
any beneficial purpose of the defense and merely become a harassment
to the landlord. The Diamond court gave no indication that it foresaw
tenant abuse of the remedy provided, although the dissent did sound a
note of general alarm at the potential consequences of the court's stance.' 6
Even under the Diamond approach, however, the landlord and tenant
are not welded together. The landlord may overcome the unfavorable presumption by producing evidence sufficient to show a legitimate business
justification for his action. 7 The questions of the sufficiency of the justification and of whether the landlord was motivated by that justification,
are questions of fact in each case.68 Although the court was not overly
expansive in its handling of what constituted a legitimate business justification, it clearly stated that a "convincing showing" by Diamond that it
was impossible or unfeasible to make repairs would suffice as a legitimate
justification. 69 Just as clearly, the court refused to accept the desire to
remove a tenant not paying rent, under these circumstances, as a legitimate
justification.70 The desire to remove a unit from the market was insufficient, in the majority view, to qualify as a legitimate justification unless
the reason for the removal was found by a jury to be sufficient to overcome the otherwise presumed unlawful motive. 71 The majority ignored
the practical problems Diamond would face in trying to convince a jury
of its pure motives, thus possibly cementing the bonds of the troublesome
union and driving Diamond, denied a legal divorce, to abandon the
72
property.
The public policy against occupancy of substandard dwellings was
examined by the court in two different types of cases. In the situation
in which the violations existed and the landlord was unable to repair,
the landlord had a legitimate reason for taking the unit off the market and
could meet his section 2301 obligations by evicting the tenant. 73 Where the
66. 463 F.2d at 871-72 (Robb, J., dissenting).

67. Id. at 865.
68. Id. at 867. The existence of a factual dispute of potential complexity, the
majority felt, made the resolution of the dispute by summary judgment inappropriate,
even with an unopposed affidavit filed by one of the parties. Id. at 866-67. Judge
Robb took issue with the majority on this procedural point. The affidavit of Diamond
stating its unwillingness to repair and desire to take the unit from the market was
not opposed by an affidavit from Mrs. Robinson. Id. at 871 (Robb, J., dissenting).
Judge Robb was of the opinion that summary judgment was appropriate since no
material issue of fact as to the motive of the landlord existed. Id. Confronted with
the affidavit, Judge Robb seemed willing to accept the proposition that Diamond's
reason for the eviction was sufficient as a matter of law, a position already rejected
bv the majority under the "inherently destructive" test. The majority thus impliedly
held that a sworn, unopposed affidavit was legally insufficient to rebut the presumption of illegal action by the landlord.
69. Id. at 865-66.
70. Id. at 865.
71. Id. at 866.
72. See id. at 871-72 (Robb, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 869.
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landlord was able but unwilling to repair, the court viewed taking the unit
off the market as constructive eviction or trying to do constructively
what he could not do actually. 74 Although the tenant has contract remedies
for such action by the landlord, exactly what they are and what relief is
75
available will require further exposition.
Judge Robb's dissent centered most of its attention, not on the specifics of the majority's opinion, but on the underlying philosophy which
Judge Robb felt the court espoused.76 The dissent saw no legal basis to
support the presumption of illicit motive which the majority established,
and rejected the concept that the solution to an apparently insolvable problem, the blight of urban housing, lay in the public control of the business
activity of the private landlord. 77 While not extensively developed, the
dissenting opinion reflected a deep-rooted distrust for the type of regulation
the majority was considered to favor, as well as a fear of the practical
78
consequences of excessive interference.
Any court could feel comfortable in taking judicial notice of the
deplorable housing conditions in America's inner cities. Tenants are
becoming more militant and organized, and, in the District of Columbia,
the Housing Regulations forbid an eviction on the basis of organizing
or belonging to such a tenant group,79 thus impliedly encouraging such
activity. The landlord who is a slumlord, either because of his own indifference or because of the unfortunate social and economic circumstances
afflicting society as a whole, evokes little sympathy. When the landlord,
or slumlord, finds the situation intolerable, unprofitable, or both, he will
most likely not invest further in his property, withdraw his capital, or
simply abandon it. The fact of landlord flight or attrition may or may not
be borne out of empirical evidence,80 but that would be the consequence
of the "Draconian" treatment of landlords8 ' which the majority tacitly
seemed to encourage and which the dissent feared. Such flight of the
private landlord, coupled with other factors, would leave the inferior
housing units, and thus their tenants, to the mercy of their most probable
8 2
new landlord, the city governmental bodies.
Taking the dissent's approach to its extremes, a landlord could argue
that excessive state regulation by legislative and judicial action in effect
had gone beyond reasonable regulation for the public health, safety, or
welfare and was in reality a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth
74. Id.
75. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (1970).
See also MODEL CODE §§ 2-204 to -208, 2-408 (Tent. Draft, 1969).
76. 463 F.2d at 871-72 (Robb, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. D.C. HOUSING REG. §2910(b)

(1970).

80. See Ackerman, note 38 supra.
81. 463 F.2d at 872 (Robb, J., dissenting).
82. In 1966, for example, New York City's Real Property Department was
the largest slumlord in the nation. SATURDAY EVENING PosT, Dec. 17, 1966, at 8.
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amendment.8 3 It remains speculative whether Judge Robb's fears would
extend so far, but when a social policy, with its actions and reactions,
is set in motion, its momentum may carry it beyond originally contemplated
boundaries.
The majority rather quickly passed over the questions raised by
Judge Robb, as if afraid of the practical difficulties of approaching them
too closely. Unfortunately, data on the influence of Diamond Housing
will not be forthcoming for some time, but even with the data available
to it at the time of the Diamond decision, the majority cavalierly accepted
the proposition that landlord regulation through code enforcement would
not affect the availability of housing.8 4 Common experience would seem
to indicate that excessive regulation causes capital to flee to the most
profitable enterprise that has the least amount of hindering regulation.
If this observation is correct, then urban housing would be a low priority
item for private capital, especially urban housing for the poor. It is
to be hoped that the prediction of the majority will prove more accurate
than that of Judge Robb, but, if so, it would appear to be more the result
of good fortune than an occurrence expected because of a rational choice
of alternatives.
Note should also be taken of the court's decision to provide "clarifications," rather than comprehensive guidelines, to resolve the problems
of applying its decision in Diamond Housing. Besides the reasons enunciated by the court,8 5 several others can be discerned. First, as evidenced
in Judge Robb's dissent,8 6 there would appear to be a "jurisdictional
restraint" on the expansive exercise of the court's power. The District
of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 197087 evidenced an intent by
Congress to leave matters of local concern - landlord-tenant matters
are notorious as such - to the local courts of the District, and to not
bring into federal courts cases which would be in state courts in other
jurisdictions.8" Second, the Diamond Housing court may have been
unwilling to burden the courts of the District with a set of guidelines
when the federal courts will no longer hear such cases, and the District
83. The fifth amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CMsT. amend. V. This is analogous to the situation where a private land owner may challenge zoning laws as
being unconstitutional "takings" of private property. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926). In regard to the application of the fifth amendment prohibition against
such taking without compensation to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (dictum) ; Chicago B. & Q. R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) ; Annot., 23 L.Ed.2d 985, 989, supplementing Annot.,
18 L.Ed.2d 1388, 1406.
84. 463 F.2d at 860.
85. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
86. 463 F.2d at 871 (Robb, J., dissenting).
87. District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
tit. 1, 84 Stat. 475 (codified in D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §§ 11-101 et seq. (Supp.
(1970).
88. 463 F.2d at 871 (Robb, J., dissenting). See 115 CONG. REc. 26072-73
(1969).
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of Columbia courts will no longer be bound by federal precedent.8 9 Finally,
after the Edwards decision and the legislative codification of Javins and
Southall Realty, the court might also have felt that with Diamond Housing
it had fulfilled its role in implementing basic policy and that future
cases should be decided with reference to such decisions without judicial
declaration of explicit guidelines. Such an approach would more easily
permit modification or changes in position should the conditions develop
differently from those the majority foresaw.
The Diamond Housing court has taken the next logical step after
Edwards in protecting the rights of tenants. However, under the policy
established by Congress of keeping essentially local matters in local
courts,90 the courts of the District of Columbia are to function with
respect to the federal courts in the same manner as the courts of the
states function with respect to the federal courts within their borders.
Therefore, the practical benefits of Diamond Housing may be somewhat
diffused and dissipated because cases which previously would have reached
a sympathetic United States Court of Appeals may now not do so, leaving
their disposition to the District of Columbia courts which may be more
subject to local pressure and lack the independence of the federal courts.9'
The impact of the Diamond decision remains speculative, and, in the
context of the increasing deterioration of urban areas, such a holding
may be a final factor in driving borderline landlords from the business,
thus injecting even greater state control and regulation into what was
once the private sector. On the other hand, it may be the one necessary
step left to keep the landlord, even with the burden of proof he bears,
from evicting the tenant in the face of legislative prohibition.
The Edwards position forbidding retaliatory eviction has been accepted by other jurisdictions, 92 but whether the rationale of Diamond
Housing will enjoy such support remains to be seen. One of the most
important factors that will influence the response to Diamond Housing is
whether the view of the majority, landlord adjustment, or that of the
dissent, landlord flight, materializes. If the former, Diamond Housing
may stand in the vanguard of future housing policy; if the latter, then
89. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. App. 1971).
90. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra.
91. This is not to say that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is "antitenant," and it should be noted that Southall Realty was decided by that court. However, the court adopted a narrow and restrictive reading of Edwards in Diamond
Housing, which may be a more accurate barometer of the court's approach to future
landlord-tenant controversies. The District of Columbia Circuit in Diamond also
viewed the holding of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as in direct conflict
with the Housing Regulations, a possible indication that the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals will interpret similar regulations restrictively.
92. See, e.g., Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Ct.
App. 1971) ; Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (Dist. Ct. 1971) ;
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970). Some jurisdictions
have adopted the rule by statute. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 35 § 1700-1 (Supp. 1973) ;
MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 5254-2 (Supp. 1972). For a further listing, see UNIFORM ACT §5.101, Comment (request for approval withdrawn 1973). Cf. MODEL CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft, 1969).
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it may well be the high water mark in the struggle to control the blight
which has affected urban housing. Diamond Housing will be either an
end or a beginning of major developments in landlord-tenant law for
some time. Despite its influence on the District of Columbia, the impact
on the policy of other jurisidictions may prove far more significant.
A final point which must be considered in regard to the impact of
this decision is the unique geographic situation in which it was decided.
The District of Columbia is not only the seat of the federal government,
but also the only totally urban jurisdiction on a level comparable to the
states. It is not faced with the different regional and economic areas
and interests which hinder state governments, make enactments of legislation more challenging, and make the judiciary more cognizant of divergent parochial viewpoints. Urban areas may be hamstrung by rural
legislators whose constituencies are not greatly moved by city problems
and who may demand that their representatives allocate resources to their
needs. To the extent that proves true, the impact of Diamond Housing
in jurisdictions other than the District of Columbia may be lessened.
James P. Cullen
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